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The Anticompetitive Effects
of Anti-Abortion Protest
Melanie K Nelson'
Each year, reproductive health providers suffer devastating
monetary losses at the hands of violent and aggressive anti-
abortion activists. Over two thousand acts of violence and over
twenty-eight thousand acts of disruption have occurred since
1977, including bombings, arsons, death threats, assaults, acid
attacks1 and blockades.2 Since 1990, abortion providers have in-
curred over $8.5 million in physical damages from arsons and
bombings alone.'
The legal system must provide an effective remedy to deter
this violent activity and assure that violence and coercion do not
impede a woman's constitutional right to abortion.4 Criminal
prosecutions present logical remedies for arsons, assaults and
bombings. Trespasses can be punished criminally or remedied
through state tort actions.5 However, neither criminal nor state
tort laws address the systemic loss of business revenues clinics
suffer as a result of these activities. Further, traditional remedies
deal only with individuals and fail to address the culpability of
organizations.'
t B.A. 1998, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Chicago.
1 See Part IID 1.
2 National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), Clinic Violence, Intimidation
and Terrorism, available online at <httpJ/www.naral.org/mediaresources/factterrorism.
html> (visited Oct 8, 2000), citing National Abortion Federation ("NAF"), NAF Violence &
Disruption Statistics, Oct 1998.
3 See Anti-Abortion Violence and Harassment, 1997: An Analysis of Trends, formerly
available online at <http://www.prochoice.org/violence/vdanaly97.htm> (visited Oct 7,
1999) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
4 See Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 154 (1973) (establishing abortion as a fundamental
privacy right under the Constitution).
. 5 See Cleveland v Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P2d 1073, 1083 (Ala 1981) (up-
holding convictions of anti-abortion protesters for violating criminal trespass ordinance by
refusing to leave abortion clinic); 1 Am Jur 2d Abortion and Birth Control § 81 (1994)
("Traditionally criminal trespass or civil injunction of trespass have been the remedies
pursued by abortion clinics or other persons or entities against whom picketing or other
activities have been addressed. Abortion protesters may also be held liable for tortious
interference with business.").
6 See Part III A.
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Contemporary understanding of the policy behind the
Sherman Act' and the scope of the statute reveal that antitrust
regulation can and should compensate for the economic damages
caused by certain types of illegal protest activity.8 Legal recogni-
tion and compensation for the economic harms inflicted upon
businesses and consumers comport with antitrust law's ultimate
goal of protecting a competitive marketplace.9
The modern anti-abortion movement provides a useful exam-
ple of the type of protest activity that antitrust laws should rem-
edy. The actions of anti-abortion protesters are unmistakably
economic in character-regardless of motive, they may result in
complete economic destruction. Anti-abortion protests corrupt the
natural functioning of the marketplace." Blockades and forced
closings of clinics limit consumers' free exercise of choice." Vio-
lent or destructive protests may impose unfair costs and barriers
to entry on existing and potential competitors."2 However, these
protests fall outside the purview of traditional antitrust suits.
Such normative judgments about typical antitrust cases should
not interfere with objective legal assessment of whether direct-
action protest satisfies the elements necessary for Sherman Act
liability.
Part of the instinctive reluctance to impose antitrust liability
in these instances stems from obvious First Amendment implica-
tions.13 Political protest activities and civil disobedience lie at the
very heart of our culture's reverence of the First Amendment
right to freedom of speech. 4 - However, the First Amendment does
not protect violent or otherwise illegal acts, regardless of their
expressive character. 5
By focusing on violent, and non-violent but illegal, protest
tactics, normative perceptions of antitrust's limitations give way
7 15 USC §§ 1-7 (1994).
8 See Part IID 2.
9 See Part I B.
10 See Part IID 2.
11 See Part IID 2.
12 See Part II D 2.
13 See Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v McMillan, 866 F2d 788, 791 (5th Cir
1989) (describing abortion protest cases as a "clash ... between constitutional rights de-
fined by the Supreme Court: an old one tracing its roots to the speech clause of the First
Amendment and before, and a new one stemming from Roe v Wade").
14 See Part IV A 2.
15 See Wisconsin v Mitchell, 508 US 476, 484 (1993) ('Violence or other types of poten-
tially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact ... are entitled to no constitutional protection."), quoting Roberts v United States
Jaycees, 468 US 609, 628 (1984).
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to a rational and useful application of the Sherman Act. Applica-
tion of antitrust laws could effectively deter perpetrators and
adequately compensate businesses and the public for the anti-
competitive harms protesters inflict. Part I of this Comment in-
troduces the elements of a successful Sherman Act 1 violation
and some relevant doctrinal exceptions to antitrust liability. Part
II explains how certain violent anti-abortion protest activities
satisfy these requirements. Part III demonstrates the failure of
other laws to compensate individuals and the public for anticom-
petitive distortions of the market. Part IV argues that doctrinal
exceptions to antitrust liability, in particular Noerr-Pennington
petitioning immunity16 and First Amendment principles, do not
prohibit application of antitrust laws to certain types of direct-
action protest. Finally, Part V proposes a test for determining the
constitutionality of applying antitrust laws to particular types of
protest activity.
I. SHERMAN ACT SECTION 1 LIABILITY FOR DIRECT
ACTION PROTEST
A. Elements of Sherman Act Section 1 Claim
The Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination ...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States."' Initially, for a court to find Sherman Act liability,
the anticompetitive activity must implicate interstate
commerce. 8 Courts must also identify a contract, combination or
conspiracy.19 Next, the courts must consider whether liability may
attach to organizations that are not business competitors in the
traditional sense and that do not act out of purely economic mo-
16 See Eastern Railroad Presidents' Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 US
127, 144 (1961) (holding that railroad companies' conspiracy to place restraints on truck-
ing companies did not violate antitrust laws because their actions were designed to
prompt government action). See also United Mine Workers of America v Pennington, 381
US 657, 670 (1965) (following Noerr in the context of union negotiations for favorable
legislation). See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence
Government Action: The Basis & Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U Chi L Rev
80, 82 (1977).
17 15 USC § 1 (1994).
18 See Gulf Oil Corp v Copp Paving Co, 419 US 186, 194 (1974) ("The jurisdictional
reach of § 1 ... is keyed directly to effects on interstate markets and interstate flow of
goods.").
19 Earl W. Kintner, 2 Federal Antitrust Law § 9.2 at 5 (Anderson 1980) ("Only those
concerted activities of contracting, conspiring, and combining, which intentionally restrain
or have the effect of unreasonably restraining trade of commerce, come within the reach of
Section 1.").
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tives.2' Finally, courts must determine whether the conduct at
issue constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade creating an-
ticompetitive effects.21
1. Defining commerce.
The Supreme Court defined the breadth of Sherman Act ju-
risdiction early in the statute's history.22 In Northern Securities
Co v United States, 23 the Court established that the Sherman Act
"embrace[s] and declare[s] to be illegal every contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy, in whatever form, of whatever nature, and
whoever may be parties to it, which directly or necessarily oper-
ates in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states."24 Under this broad principle, the Sherman Act's potential
jurisdiction coincides with the breadth of interstate commerce.
While a recent Supreme Court decision appears to narrow
the definition of interstate commerce, 25 modern non-profit organi-
zations engage in activities that clearly involve interstate com-
merce. 6 As the Supreme Court announced in McLain v Real Es-
tate Board of New Orleans, Inc,27 since the enactment of the
Sherman Act "experience, forms and modes of business and com-
merce have changed along with changes in communication and
20 See generally Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773 (1975). In dicta, the Court
first raised the issue of non-profit exemptions from antitrust laws: "The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated
differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the one with which we are
confronted today." Id at 788-89 n 17.
21 See Part I D.
22 See Standard Oil Co of New Jersey v United States, 221 US 1, 59-60 (1911) (de-
scribing the scope of the Sherman Act as an "all embracing enumeration to make sure that
no form of contract or combination by which an undue restraint of ... commerce was
brought about could save such restraint from condemnation.") (emphasis omitted).
23 193 US 197 (1904).
24 Id at 331 (emphasis in original). See also US Const Art I § 8 Cl 3 ("The Congress
shall have Power... To regulate Commerce ... among the several States. ").
25 See United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 559 (1995) (holding that object of regulation
must "substantially affect" interstate commerce in order to maintain distinction between
what is "truly national and truly local"). Note that Lopez also struck down the statute at
issue in that case because it contained no jurisdictional requirement "which would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce." Id at 561. The Sherman Act possesses such a jurisdictional element, applying
only to combinations or conspiracies "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States." 15 USC § 15.
26 Earl W. Kintner, 1 Federal Antitrust Laws § 6.1 at 286 (Anderson 1980) ("The com-
plex structure of modern commercial transactions, industrial practices, and economic
relationships leads to the likelihood of finding some interstate aspects in virtually every
business setting.").
27 444 US 232 (1980).
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travel, and innovations in methods of conducting particular busi-
nesses have altered relationships in commerce. Application of the
[Sherman] Act reflects an adaptation to these changing circum-
stances.""
Courts have recognized the commercial effects of non-profit
activity in several contexts, including: professional associations
setting ethical standards for members; 2 universities setting fi-
nancial aid policies; ° hospitals providing medical services to local
patrons;" and abortion clinics purchasing supplies in interstate
commerce. 2 Therefore, antitrust law can regulate activity with
some commercial character as long as it substantially affects in-
terstate commerce.33
2. Identifying combinations and conspirators.
Due to the unlikelihood of a contractual relationship between
protesters and the object of their protest, § 1 liability turns upon
whether a combination or conspiracy exists. 4 Courts apply the
28 Id at 241.
29 See Boddicker v Arizona State Dental Association, 549 F2d 626, 629 (9th Cir 1977)
(finding interstate nexus due to the scope of the ASDA's membership, programs and dues);
American Medical Association v United States, 130 F2d 233, 249 (DC Cir 1942) ("Neither
the fact that the conspiracy may be intended to promote the public welfare, or that of the
industry, nor the fact that it is designed to eliminate unfair, fraudulent and unlawful
practices, is sufficient to avoid the penalties of the Sherman Act.") (citations omitted).
30 See United States v Brown University, 5 F3d 658, 668 (3d Cir 1993) (holding that
award of scholarships constituted commercial activity).
31 See Hospital Corp of America v FTC, 807 F2d 1381, 1384 (7th Cir 1986) (noting
competitive effect of merger of two hospitals); FTC v University Health Inc, 938 F2d 1206,
1209 (11th Cir 1991) (granting preliminary injunction against merger of non-profit hospi-
tals). But see Dedication and Everlasting Love to Animals v Humane Society, 50 F3d 710,
713-14 (9th Cir 1995) (holding that non-profits' solicitation of charitable contributions did
not constitute commercial activity).
32 See Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc v Mohammad, 586 F2d 530, 540-41 (5th
Cir 1978) (finding an interstate nexus because restraints allegedly affected purchases of
out-of-state supplies and business with out-of-state patients).
33 See United States v Yellow Cab Co, 332 US 218, 225-26 (1947) ("[T]he amount of
interstate trade ... affected by the conspiracy is immaterial in determining whether a
violation of the Sherman Act has been charged .... Section 1 of the Act outlaws unrea-
sonable restraints on interstate commerce, regardless of the amount of the commerce
affected."). See also Lopez, 514 US at 559-60 (giving examples of activities that "substan-
tially affect" interstate commerce), citing Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US 294, 299 (1964)
(involving restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc v United States, 379 US 241, 261 (1964) (holding that inns and hotels catering to in-
terstate guests sufficiently affect interstate commerce); Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111,
128-29 (1942) (allowing federal regulation of wheat production primarily for home con-
sumption).
34 See Northern Securities Co v United States, 193 US 197, 403 (1904) (Holmes dis-
senting) ("The words [in § 1] hit two classes of cases ... [c]ontracts in restraint of trade
and combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.").
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terms "combination" or "conspiracy" 5 to mean a union or associa-
tion of two or more persons, intent on accomplishing the same
purpose.36 The combination or conspiracy must be continuous,
constituting acts performed over a period of time.37 Finally, par-
ticipants need only share a "common scheme"-they need not
know of every act performed during the course of the conspiracy.a
Therefore, a trade group or political organization falls within
the definition of a combination or conspiracy. Such organizations,
by definition, are composed of two or more persons with a com-
mon purpose.39 Any form of collective activity by two or more peo-
ple with an illegitimate purpose and continuous operation may
properly be condemned under antitrust laws if it operates in re-
straint of trade.4" Under this rubric, actions of non-profits can
justify liability when the actors involved succeed in creating anti-
competitive effects.
3. Identifying necessary anticompetitive intent.
To substantiate a Sherman Act § 1 civil claim, plaintiffs need
only prove general intent.4 Courts have held that proof of con-
certed action that unreasonably restrained trade establishes suf-
35 "Combination" and "conspiracy" may be used interchangeably. See Kintner, 2 Fed-
eral Antitrust Law § 9.4 at 13 (cited in note 19); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc v International
Parts Corp, 392 US 134, 141-42 (1968) (defining combinations as theories of conspiracy).
36 Kintner, 2 Federal Antitrust Laws § 9.3 at 8 (cited in note 19). See American To-
bacco Co v United States, 328 US 781, 810 (1946) ("Where the circumstances are such as
to warrant a jury in finding that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a common
design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement .... a con-
spiracy is established."); United States v Crescent Amusement Co, 323 US 173, 189-90
(1944) (defining combination in terms of "unity of purpose" and "unity of action").
37 Kintner, 2 Federal Antitrust Laws, § 9.4 at 13 (cited in note 19).
38 See TV Signal Co of Aberdeen v American Telephone and Telegraph Co, 462 F2d
1256, 1259-60 (8th Cir 1972) ("Although knowledge is implicit in the requirement of unity
of purpose, no case of which we are aware requires that each party to a conspiracy knows
of each transaction encompassed by the conspiracy .... [T]hat defendants knowingly
participated in a common scheme or purpose ... is enough to satisfy any knowledge re-
quirement of § 1.").
39 Kintner, 2 Federal Antitrust Laws, § 9.16 at 32-33 (cited in note 19).
40 Id.
41 See United States v United States Gypsum Co, 438 US 422, 443-44 (1978) (holding
that only a showing of general intent was required to establish misdemeanor Sherman Act
violation); Interstate Circuit, Inc v United States, 306 US 208, 226-27 (1939) (explaining
that, for Sherman Act purposes, knowledge of each act and an intent to commit each act
constituted sufficient intent despite the actor's lack of specific intent to violate the anti-
trust laws). See also Albert Pick-Barth Co, Inc v Mitchell Woodbury Corp, 57 F2d 96, 101
(1st Cir 1932) (holding that if the defendant's "purpose and intent ... [was] to eliminate
the plaintiff as a competitor" they had acted in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act). But
see George R. Whitten, Jr, Inc v Paddock Pool Builders, Inc, 508 F2d 547, 560 (1st Cir
1974) (refusing to apply per se test declared in Pick-Barth).
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ficient general intent.42 General intent may be inferred from proof
of anticompetitive results in civil antitrust cases. In analyzing
the intent necessary to substantiate a civil § 1 violation, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that "the government need not prove that it was
the defendants' purpose to affect commerce; it suffices that their
conduct had that natural effect."43 Courts faced with a civil § 1
claim must examine the results of the organization's activity in-
stead of its specific motivations. For criminal prosecutions under
the Sherman Act, however, the government must prove general
intent-it cannot be inferred from the fact that the defendants
engaged in anticompetitive conduct.44 Thus, for civil liability, a
non-profit organization need only intend an act that creates anti-
competitive effects; whether the organization ultimately intended
to create anticompetitive effects is only relevant to criminal
prosecutions.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held non-profit organi-
zations liable for antitrust violations despite their non-economic
motives. For instance, in NCAA v Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma,45 the Court announced that "[tihere is no doubt
that the sweeping language of § 1 applies to nonprofit entities,"
adding that "in the past we have imposed antitrust liability on
nonprofit entities which have engaged in anticompetitive con-
duct."46 Additionally, in a recent decision analyzing the Sherman
Act's potential application to non-profit enterprises, the Fourth
Circuit held that "the dispositive inquiry is whether the transac-
tion is commercial, not whether the entity engaging in the trans-
action is commercial."47 Thus, as long as the questioned practices
substantially affect interstate commerce, general intent is satis-
fied; the plaintiff and defendant need not be business competi-
42 See United States v Topco Associates, Inc, 405 US 596, 610 (1972) (holding horizon-
tal restraint on trade per se illegal regardless of the defendant's alleged specific intent to
increase competition); United States v General Motors Corp, 384 US 127, 146 (1966)
("[Wihere businessmen concert their actions in order to deprive others of access to mer-
chandise ... we need not inquire into the economic motivation underlying their conduct.");
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc v FTC, 312 US 457, 467-68 (1941) (inferring
requisite intent from fashion designer who instituted boycott of retail stores selling copies
of the designer's patterns).
43 United States v Arena, 180 F3d 380, 390 (2d Cir 1999).
44 See United States Gypsum Co, 438 US at 435 ("[A defendant's state of mind or
intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense which must be established by evi-
dence."). But see United States v Gillen, 599 F2d 541, 543-45 (3d Cir), cert denied, 4 US
866 (1979) (holding that when conduct is unlawful per se, intent may be inferred even in a
criminal case).
45 468 US 85 (1984).
46 Id at n 22.
47 Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd v W.R. Grace & Co-Connecticut, 156 F3d 535, 541 (1998).
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tors." The bulk of cases follow this logic and reject any per se ex-
emption for non-profit organizations, despite the fact that such
organizations do not fit into the traditional antitrust paradigm.49
4. Identifying anticompetitive effects.
In discerning relevant anticompetitive effects, the Supreme
Court announced that "[t]he antitrust laws ... were enacted for
'the protection of competition, not competitors'."5 ° Commenting on
the legislative intent underlying the Sherman Act, Robert Bork
noted that:
[Clongress intended the courts to implement.. . only that
value we would today call consumer welfare .... [T]he
policy the courts were intended to apply is the maximiza-
tion of wealth or consumer want satisfaction. This re-
quires courts to distinguish between ... activities that in-
crease wealth through efficiency and those that decrease it
through restriction of output.5'
Analysis of the policies underlying the Sherman Act reveals a
variety of anticompetitive effects Congress intended antitrust
laws to address. An action that results in the destruction of a vic-
tim's business may violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.52 Other anti-
48 See United States v Lopez, 514 US at 559 ("[T]he proper test requires an analysis of
whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce."). See also Part
IA 1.
49 American Society of Mechanical Engineers v Hydrolevel Corp, 456 US 556, 576
(1982) ("It is beyond debate that nonprofit organizations can be held liable under the anti-
trust laws."); Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773, 787 (1975) ("We cannot find
support for the proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion [of an
organization of learned professionals] ... The language of § 1 of the Sherman Act, of
course, contains no exception."); American Medical Association v United States, 130 F2d
233, 249 (DC Cir 1942) ("Neither the fact that the conspiracy may be intended to promote
the public welfare, or that of the industry, . . . is sufficient to avoid the penalties of the
Sherman Act.") (citations omitted); Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc v Middle States
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc, 302 F Supp 459, 466 (D DC 1969) ("[A]
laudatory purpose or intent will not excuse violations of the [antitrust] laws.") (revd on
other grounds). But see Klor's, Inc v Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc, 359 US 207, 213 n 7
(1959) ("[TIhe [Sherman] Act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objec-
tives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations, like labor unions, which
normally have other objectives."), relying on Apex Hosiery Co v Leader, 310 US 469 (1940).
50 Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc, 429 US 477, 488 (1977), quoting Brown
Shoe Co, Inc v United States, 370 US 294, 320 (1965).
51 Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J L & Econ 7, 7
(1966).
52 See Council of Defense of New Mexico v International Magazine Co, 267 F 390, 441
(8th Cir 1920) (finding that a "declared and obvious purpose was to destroy complainant's
business," in violation of Sherman Act § 1).
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competitive effects upon which courts have based liability include
erecting barriers to entry, limiting free consumer choice,53 and
causing concentration or monopoly within an industry.54 In addi-
tion, an appreciable reduction in the number of competitors may
support a finding of diminished competitive conditions.5
The actions of modern non-profits may involve all of these
prohibited behaviors. As noted in one seminal antitrust treatise,
"[aill the possible objectives of antitrust law-from efficient re-
source allocation, minimum production costs, and maximum in-
novation to equal access to the market . .. can implicate the ac-
tivities of non-profit organizations."56
B. First Amendment Petitioning Immunity and Antitrust
Even if an activity satisfies all of the elements of a Sherman
Act § 1 claim, the Constitution may still immunize that anticom-
petitive conduct from liability. In Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers Assn v United States,57 the Supreme Court exempted ap-
peals for government action from antitrust liability." Protest ac-
tivity-an arguably more indirect form of petitioning than lob-
bying Congress or seeking relief in the courts-can nonetheless
constitute protected petitioning activity. 9 As the Court recog-
53 See Standard Oil Co v United States, 221 US 1, 58 (1911) (interpreting congres-
sional intent of the Sherman Act drafters as "prohibit[ing] . .. all contracts or acts which
were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions ... with the intent to do wrong to
the general public and to limit the right of individuals, thus restraining the free flow of
commerce.").
54 See United States v Addyston Pipe & Steel Co, 85 F 271, 282-83 (6th Cir 1898)
(indicating that there was no basis upon which to "justify or excuse the restraint[s]" if they
"necessarily have a tendency to monopoly").
55 See Vietnamese Fishermen's Assoc v Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F Supp 993,
1010 (S D Tex 1981) ("A lessening of competitive conditions, can be shown if the number of
competitors is reduced appreciably."); Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc v Budget Rent-a-Car
Systems, Inc, 491 F Supp 1199, 1213 (D Hawaii 1980) ("Lessening of competition can be
shown if the number of competitors is reduced appreciably.").
56 Phillip E. Areeda and Howard Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law § 232.2 at 297 (1989 &
Supp 1993).
57 365 US 127 (1961).
58 Id at 144-45 (holding that railroad companies' conspiracy to place restraints on
trucking companies did not violate antitrust laws because the railroad companies' actions
were designed to prompt government action); United Mine Workers of America v Penning-
ton, 381 US 657, 670 (1965) (holding that the defendant's good or bad faith in petitioning
the government was irrelevant in determining whether antitrust laws applied.) The First
Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech
... or the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
US Const Amend I.
59 See Kintner & Bauer, 10 Federal Antitrust Laws § 77.5 at 218 (Anderson 1984)
("[Ilmmunity applie[s] even when the challenged conduct ... was simply an attempt to
influence public opinion and general government policy, rather than an attempt to obtain
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nized in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp v Indian Head, Inc,60 "im-
munity cannot be dismissed on the ground that the conduct at
issue involved no 'direct' petitioning of government officials, for
Noerr itself immunized a form of 'indirect' petitioning."6'
Several limitations on Noerr immunity apply in the case of di-
rect-action protest. Though indirect petitioning may receive im-
munity, Noerr does not extend to marketplace injuries caused by
the defendant that do not "flow [ ] directly from government ac-
tion."62 Furthermore, Noerr immunity does not apply to petitions
that merely constitute a "sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business rela-
tionships of a competitor."" If no objectively reasonable attempt
to petition exists, the asserted political activity is deemed a
"sham" and receives no First Amendment protection. 4
Traditional "sham" claims involve litigious defendants who
use the courts not to obtain relief, but to harass commercial op-
ponents.65 Professor Hovenkamp offers a definition of "sham" pe-
titioning that applies to a broader range of activities than mere
harassing litigation. 6 According to Hovenkamp, a sham petition
"is nothing more than a subterfuge designed to harass a ri-
val .... [T]he rival's injury is intended to result not from the gov-
ernmental action, for no such action is really anticipated, but
rather from the petitioning process itself.'6' The ultimate test for
whether a petition is merely a sham and thus does not receive
First Amendment protection is whether the petitioning activity
particular government action."). See also Missouri v National Organization for Women,
Inc, 620 F2d 1301, 1315 (8th Cir 1980) (upholding legality of boycott designed to pressure
citizens into ratification of the ERA).
60 486 US 492 (1988).
61 Id at 503. See also Eastern Railroad Presidents' Conference v Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc, 365 US 127, 140 (1960) (finding defendants not liable for conducting fraudulent pub-
licity campaign to influence public opinion about the trucking industry).
62 Sessions Tank Liners, Inc v Joor Manufacturing Inc, 17 F3d 295, 299 (9th Cir
1994).
63 Noerr, 365 US at 144.
64 See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc v Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc, 508
US 49, 60 (1993).
65 See California Motor Transport Co v Trucking Unlimited, 404 US 508, 511 (1972)
(holding that defendants had conspired to put plaintiffs out of business by instigating
federal and state lawsuits).
66 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its
Practice § 18.3 at 687 (West 2d ed 1999).
67 Id.
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constitutes an "objectively reasonable" attempt to attain a favor-
able government response. 8
Regardless of whether an activity is deemed a "sham," and
thus loses Noerr immunity, antitrust liability still cannot attach
if the First Amendment protects the activity for reasons other
than petitioning. The First Amendment does not protect the ac-
tivities of direct-action protesters who use violence to convey their
message. 9 As the Supreme Court declared, "violence has no sanc-
tuary in the First Amendment, and the use of weapons, gunpow-
der, and gasoline may not constitutionally masquerade under the
guise of 'advocacy."'7 ° The difficulty in determining the proper
degree of First Amendment protection arises when delineating
between the aspects of the activity that are violent and unpro-
tected and those that are non-violent and protected.7'
C. Precedents Involving Antitrust Claims against
Direct-Action Protesters
Courts have only infrequently dealt with antitrust claims
against non-profit political organizations. Three sets of cases il-
lustrate the particular conceptual issues that arise when plain-
tiffs bring antitrust claims against these types of organizations.
1. Competitors and congressional intent.
In National Organization for Women, Inc, v Scheidler,72 the
plaintiff ("NOW") charged abortion foes with violations of the
Sherman Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act ("RICO"). 7 The Seventh Circuit overruled the district
court's finding that Noerr exempted the defendants' protest ac-
tivity from antitrust liability.74 The court announced that
"[a]lthough the defendants' acts generated publicity which they
may have hoped would influence government actors, this tangen-
68 See Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 US at 60 (establishing objectively rea-
sonable standard).
69 See Part IV A.
70 NAACP v Claiborne Hardware, Co, Inc, 458 US 886, 916 (1982), quoting Samuels v
Mackell, 401 US 66, 75 (1970) (Douglas concurring).
71 See Part IV A 2.
72 NOW v Scheidler, 968 F2d 612 (7th Cir 1992).
73 18 USC §§ 1961-68 (1994).
74 See Scheidler, 968 F2d at 616. See also NOW v Scheidler, 765 F Supp 937, 945 (N D
Ill 1991).
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tial contact is not sufficient to invoke First Amendment protec-
tion for otherwise criminal behavior."
75
Though the Seventh Circuit denied Noerr immunity, it af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of antitrust claims on other
grounds.7" The court of appeals announced that Congress had not
intended antitrust laws to apply to the defendant's actions.77 The
court based this conclusion on the Sherman Act's legislative his-
tory-in particular, the legislators' discussions of temperance ac-
tivism.7"
Enigmatically, the court noted "that all 'protest' or non-
commercially oriented activities are exempt [from the Sherman
Act] because of the First Amendment,"79 but then determined that
the Congress limited the Sherman Act "to prevent[ing] business
competitors from making restraining arrangements for their own
economic advantage." ° Thus, the Seventh Circuit rejected NOW's
antitrust claims based upon legislative history that the court in-
terpreted as excluding social causes and non-business competi-
tors.s"
Though the Supreme Court later reversed the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in NOW v Scheidler on other grounds, 2 the anti-
trust claims were never reexamined. 3 As such, no Supreme Court
treatment of antitrust claims against anti-abortion protesters
exists. The lack of an authoritative pronouncement on the issue
warrants reexamination of the Seventh Circuit's holdings on both
Noerr immunity and legislative intent. 4
75 Scheidler, 968 F2d at 616.
76 Id at 621 ("[Plarallels between [anti-abortion] activities and those of the temper-
ance crusaders, which Congress ... intended to exclude from the operation of the Act,
force[ I us to conclude that the defendant's activities are not prohibited by the Sherman
Act.").
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 968 F2d at 622, relying on Apex Hosiery v Leader, 310 US 469, 487 (1940) (rejecting
defendant's argument for blanket antitrust immunity for union organizing).
80 Id at 621.
81 Id.
82 See NOW v Scheidler, 510 US 249, 262 (1994) (holding that RICO did not require
showing of economic motive on the part of defendants).
83 See NOW v Scheidler, 508 US 971 (1994) (granting certiorari solely for RICO issue).
See also Faye Clayton and Sara N. Love, NOW v Scheidler: Protecting Women's Access to
Reproductive Health Services, 62 Albany L Rev 967 (1999). Clayton and Love, counsel for
the plaintiffs in NOW v Scheidler, note that because of court rulings against the applica-
bility of antitrust laws, only the RICO claims proceeded to trial. Id at n 15.
84 See Parts II C 2 and IV A-B.
338 [2000:
ANTITRUST AND ANTI-ABORTION PROTEST
2. Burden of establishing anticompetitive effects.
Another precedent dealing specifically with anti-abortion
protest underscores the necessity of proving anticompetitive ef-
fects in order to prevail on § 1 claims. In Northeast Women's Cen-
ter, Inc v McMonagle,"5 a federal district court granted the defen-
dant's motion for a directed verdict due to the plaintiffs' failure to
focus on the specific requirements of Sherman Act § 1 liability.86
The plaintiffs, who had requested treble damages under the Clay-
ton Act,87 argued that defendants had attempted to destroy the
Center's business.88 While the plaintiffs presented evidence re-
garding the defendants' destructive intent, they neglected to
show how the elimination of their business contributed to a less-
ening of competition. 9 The district court concluded that "to prove
an antitrust violation in this case, the plaintiff had to demon-
strate an actual anticompetitive impact on the market for abor-
tion services within the relevant geographic area."9" Because the
plaintiffs failed to clarify or identify the anticompetitive effects,
the court dismissed their claims.9' Northeast Women's Center ex-
emplifies the requirement that in a successful antitrust suit,
plaintiffs must show evidence of the anticompetitive effects cre-
ated by illegal direct-action protest.92
3. First Amendment implications of direct-action protest.
Finally, a set of cases dealing with political boycotts illus-
trates the difficult First Amendment issues that arise when
plaintiffs invoke antitrust law to enjoin direct-action protest.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, courts agreed that the First
Amendment did not protect violent behavior; but courts divided
over whether violence committed during a political boycott taints
85 670 F Supp 1300 (E D Pa 1987).
86 Id at 1305.
87 15 USC § 15 (1994).
88 See Northeast Women's Center v McMonagle, 1987 US Dist Lexis 1036 (E D Pa).
89 See id at 1037, (noting that the lower court had warned plaintiffs that "proof of
injury to the plaintiffs business will be deemed insufficient absent further proof that such
injury amounted to an unreasonable restraint on trade").
90 Northeast Women's Center, 670 F Supp at 1305.
91 Id. See also Northeast Women's Center, 1987 US Dist Lexis at 1037.
92 In NOW v Scheidler the District Court also listed the anticompetitive effects suffi-
cient to establish Sherman Act liability, though it rejected the complaint on other grounds:
"Plaintiffs have failed to make the required showing that the defendants have exerted
market control of the supply of abortion services, control of price (beyond raising prices by
increasing costs), or discrimination between would-be purchasers." 968 F2d at 622-23
(citations omitted).
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the activity enough to make the otherwise protected boycott effort
illegal."
These cases culminated in 1982 with NAACP v Claiborne
Hardware Co. 94 The NAACP had been engaged in a continuous
attempt to pressure businesses to cease racially discriminatory
practices. The record in Claiborne revealed sporadic accounts of
violent activity accompanying the boycott.9 The Supreme Court
refused to declare the entire boycott illegal, however, because "[a]
massive and prolonged effort to change the social, political, and
economic structure of a local environment cannot be character-
ized as a violent conspiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral
consequences of relatively few violent acts." 7 The Court declared
that a state "may not award compensation for the consequences
of nonviolent, protected activity."" Nevertheless, it allowed recov-
ery under antitrust for "losses proximately caused by unlawful
conduct."9 Thus, Claiborne establishes that antitrust liability
may indeed be imposed for illegal protest activity that proxi-
mately causes anticompetitive economic effects.
II. VIOLENT ANTI-ABORTION PROTEST SATISFIES THE
REQUIREMENTS OF A SHERMAN ACT SECTION 1 CLAIM
Certain direct-action protest activities meet all of the re-
quirements for a successful § 1 claim.' However, the Sherman
Act cannot reach activity that the First Amendment protects.'01
93 Compare Smith v Grady, 411 F2d 181, 189 (5th Cir 1969) (stating that a boycott
receives no First Amendment protection when it is "violent, threatening, menacing, in-
sulting, or clearly calculated to provoke a breach of the peace"), with Machesky v Bizzell,
414 F2d 283, 291 (5th Cir 1969) (holding an injunction overbroad for "lump[ing] the pro-
tected with the unprotected in such a way as to abridge important public interests" in free
expression) and Kelly v Page, 335 F2d 114, 119 (5th Cir 1964) (denying injunction against
picketing).
94 458 US 886 (1982).
95 Id at 889, 898-900 (boycotting businesses to pressure them to meet demands for
desegregation, public improvement in black residential areas, and hiring of black police-
men).
96 Id at 904, 923-24 (reflecting ten isolated incidents of violence over a seven-year
period). Compare Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v Meadowmoor Dair-
ies, Inc, 312 US 287, 294-95 (1941) (affirming injunction against violent and non-violent
activity because of the pervasiveness of the acts of violence reflected in the record).
97 Claiborne, 458 US at 933.
98 Id at 919. For general discussion of the case, see Carl B. Boyd, Jr, Comment, Count-
less Free-Standing Trees: Non-Labor Boycotts After NAACP v Claiborne Hardware Co, 71
Ky L J 899, 907-12 (1982-83).
99 Claiborne, 458 US at 918.
100 See Part I.
1o See Part LV A.
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Unlawful anti-abortion protests offer a prime example of protest
activities that meet the elements of a § 1 violation and do not re-
ceive First Amendment protection. Thus, antitrust laws can, and
should, apply.
A. Reproductive Health Services Can Be Regulated
as Objects of Interstate Commerce
An analysis of the potential antitrust liability of direct-action
protesters must begin by establishing whether the protest activ-
ity affects interstate commerce. Courts have consistently upheld
federal regulation of anti-abortion violence in the face of Com-
merce Clause challenges." 2 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
held that the day-to-day business operations of an abortion pro-
vider created a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to per-
mit a cause of action under RICO.0 3 The Seventh Circuit held
that a plaintiff abortion provider satisfies the interstate com-
merce requirement by serving out-of-state patients and purchas-
ing supplies from out-of-state companies.0 4 Additionally, courts
have defined women seeking abortion services as consumers in
interstate commerce.0 5 Furthermore, courts generally grant a
broad jurisdictional scope to antitrust laws and even uphold ap-
plication in circumstances where only a slight interstate nexus
exists.0 6
B. Direct-action Protest Groups May Operate as "Combinations"
or "Conspiracies" as Defined by the Sherman Act
An association or organization such as Operation Rescue0 7
constitutes a combination of two or more persons with a common
102 See, for example, United States v Bird, 124 F3d 667, 678 (5th Cir 1997) (holding
that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE") was a legitimate regulation
of interstate activity having substantial affect on interstate commerce); United States v
Wilson, 73 F3d 675, 680 (7th Cir 1995) (reversing district court ruling that FACE was
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause).
103 National Organization for Women, Inc v Scheidler, 510 US 249, 252 (1994).
104 See United States v Anderson, 716 F2d 446, 447 (7th Cir 1983) (finding that anti-
abortion protests that impede clinic operations affect interstate commerce so as to fall
under federal jurisdiction).
105 See Mother & Unborn Baby Care of North Texas, Inc v Texas, 749 SW 2d 533, 538
(Tex App 1988).
106 See Hospital Building Co v Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 US 738, 744-46 (1976)
(holding provision of surgical services constituted interstate commerce even though en-
tirely local in scale).
107 See NOW v Operation Rescue, 726 F Supp 1483, 1487 (E D Va 1989) (describing
Operation Rlescue as an organization "whose members oppose abortion" and "intentionally
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scheme as required by § 1 of the Sherman Act.1"8 To establish a
conspiracy or combination among the members of an anti-
abortion organization, a plaintiff must show the defendant's
knowledge of an organization's illegitimate goals and illegal tac-
tics."9
Anti-abortion organizations such as Operation Rescue and the
elusive "Army of God""0 inform members of common goals and
techniques by publishing tactical manuals on topics ranging from
instructions for operating misleading pro-life counseling centers"'
to how-to-manuals for building bombs." 2 For example, the facts of
NOW v Scheidler reveal that the defendant urged his followers to
"stop abortion in every way possible."" 3 To this end, Scheidler,
leader of the Pro-Life Action Network,"4 gave members of his or-
ganization the manual "Closed: 99 Ways to Stop Abortion." 115
Acting on the tactics listed in the manual, the defendants invaded
a women's health center in Florida where they "injured the cen-
ter's administrator and another woman, the medical procedures
room was ransacked, and medical supplies were destroyed.""6 In
another example, Operation Rescue, one of the defendant organi-
zations in NOW v Scheidler, initiated training camps to instruct
followers in the group's aggressive tactics, including blockading
clinics and following clinic workers to their homes."'
In order to impute members' acts to their organization, the
acts must be within the scope of the members' authority."8 Clai-
trespass on the clinic's premises for the purpose of blockading the clinic's entrances and
exits, thereby effectively closing the clinic").
108 See Part I B.
109 See Part I B.
110 See Jennifer Gonnerman, The Terrorist Campaign Against Abortion, Village Voice
36 (Nov 10, 1998) (describing the Army of God as a "loosely organized network of terror-
ists" linked to at least a dozen acts of violence).
111 See Robert J. Pearson, How to Start and Operate Your Own Pro-Life Outreach
Crisis Pregnancy Centers 5 (Pearson Foundation).
112 See Timothy Egan, The Roots of Terror-A Special Report: Is Abortion Violence a
Plot? Conspiracy is Not Confirmed, NY Times 1 (June 18, 1995) (reporting contents of the
"Army of God" manual).
113 Clayton and Love, 62 Alb L Rev at 927 n 27 (quoting plaintiffs Exhibit 628 at 7,
Scheidler (No. 86-C-7888), a 1983 letter from Joseph Scheidler to Ms. Magazine) (cited in
note 83).
114 NOW v Scheidler, 968 F2d 612, 615 (7th Cir 1992).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See Kim Cobb, How to Grow a Revolution, Houston Chron A16 (Mar 28, 1993).
118 See NAACP v Claiborne Hardware Co, 458 US 886, 933 (1982) (holding that defen-
dants were not liable for economic damages caused by a largely non-violent political boy-
cott under antitrust laws).
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borne established the test for finding the umbrella organization
liable as conspirators under antitrust claims. Whether an action
constitutes an unlawful conspiracy, according to the Court, de-
pends upon the source of incitement for violent action.119 An or-
ganization cannot be held liable for the illegal acts of its members
unless the acts were undertaken with the organization's consent
or knowledge and were within the scope of activity authorized by
the organization. 20 Thus, group liability depends on whether tac-
tical manuals or other sources authorized the group's members to
conduct violent or illegal protest activity.
C. Antitrust Liability Does Not Require a Showing of Economic
Competition between Protesters and the Target of
Protest Activity
If an anti-abortion organization conspires towards illegal
ends, it may still be held liable under antitrust laws even though
it is not in economic competition with the clinic it targets. Both
contemporary case law and legislative intent support the applica-
tion of antitrust laws to organizations that are not in economic
competition.
1. Current case law expands the Sherman Act's scope
beyond economic competitors.
Applying antitrust laws to interactions between anti-abortion
protesters and clinics appears unusual because the two groups do
not compete for business. Nevertheless, under the prevailing in-
terpretation of the Sherman Act's scope, the Act does not require
that the parties be competitors. 2' Courts have imposed antitrust
liability on non-profit universities that set regulations for sport-
ing events and professional organizations that set safety stan-
dards. 22 For example, in Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar 23 the
"I The Court held that plaintiffs could not impute liability to the NAACP as an or-
ganization through boycott leader Charles Evers because "there is no evidence ... that
Evers authorized, ratified, or directly threatened acts of violence." Id at 929. See also
Boyd, 71 Ky L J at 917 ("Only if it is proved that the organization promoted or approved
violence can liability be placed on the organization.") (cited in note 98).
120 Claiborne, 458 US at 930 ("The NAACP ... may be held responsible for the acts of
its agents throughout the country that are undertaken within the scope of their actual or
apparent authority.").
121 See Part II C 1.
122 NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85, 100 n 22
(1984) ("There is no doubt that the sweeping language of § 1 applies to nonprofit enti-
ties."); American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc v Hydrolevel Corp, 456 US 556, 576
(1982) ("It is beyond debate that nonprofit organizations can be.held liable under the anti-
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Court held that the bar association's public service character did
not justify immunity from antitrust laws.124
In Northeast Women's Center v McMonagle,125 the district
court rejected the defendant's motion for dismissal because "the
alleged violators are not doctors in direct competition for the
plaintiff's clients. 12 s Supreme Court cases analyzing antitrust
claims against not-for-profit organizations bolster this
conclusion.'27 The Supreme Court declared in 1948 that "[t]he
[Sherman] Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, pro-
tecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by
whomever they may be perpetrated."128 Thus, in the specific fac-
tual context of anti-abortion protest, a plaintiff need not demon-
strate that a competitive business relationship existed between
direct-action protest groups and the target of their anticompeti-
tive actions.
2. Legislative intent with respect to non-profit liability
under the Sherman Act.
Just as an absence of economic competition between the par-
ties does not bar antitrust liability, interpretations of legislative
intent do not forbid courts from applying antitrust laws to direct-
action protest. In NOW v Scheidler,129 the Seventh Circuit dis-
missed antitrust claims based on the court's interpretation of the
Sherman Act drafters' intent.3 ° During the Senate debate on the
Sherman bill, Senator James Wilson introduced an amendment
that would exempt organizations "intended to promote the execu-
tion of the laws of that state." 3' Senator Wilson was particularly
concerned with the Women's Christian Temperance Union, a
trust laws."); Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773, 787 (1975) ("We cannot find
support for the proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion [of an
organization] ... The language of § 1 of the Sherman Act, of course, contains no excep-
tion.").
123 421 US 773.
124 Id at 787.
125 624 F Supp 736 (E D Pa 1985).
126 Id at 740 ("[I]t is not dispositive for the defendants to argue that an antitrust injury
has not occurred because the alleged violators are not doctors in direct competition for the
plaintiffs clients.")
127 See notes 119-22.
128 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc v American Crystal Sugar Co, 334 US 219, 236
(1948).
129 968 F2d 612 (7th Cir 1992).
130 Id at 620 (announcing that the legislative history "provides a fair indication that
Congress did not intend to reach every activity that might effect [sic] business").
131 21 Cong Rec 2639, 2658 (1890).
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group that discouraged the manufacture and use of alcohol, then
illegal in Iowa."2
Senator Sherman responded that he had no objection to the
amendment, stating, "I do not see any reason for putting in [an
exclusion for] temperance societies any more than churches or
school-houses or any other kind of moral or education associa-
tions that may be organized."13 3 Sherman continued, arguing that
that "such an association is not in any sense a combination or
arrangement made to interfere with interstate commerce."134 In
Scheidler, the Seventh Circuit interpreted this interchange as an
indication that because of their similarity to temperance activ-
ists, anti-abortion activists could not properly be held liable for
antitrust violations."'
Though Congress considered amendments to the bill that
gave charitable or non-profit business activities explicit exemp-
tions, none passed.'36 Despite the Seventh Circuit's interpreta-
tion, Sherman's statement may not be an indication that Con-
gress intended to exempt non-profit charitable organizations from
antitrust scrutiny.'37 Instead, Sherman may have been expressing
a normative judgment about what types of activities would affect
the marketplace.' 3' As one author argues, Senator Sherman and
his supporters "seem to have convinced the Fifty-First Congress
that the boundaries imposed by the 'trade or commerce' language
of the Act were a sufficient prophylactic."'39
While charitable organizations in the late nineteenth century
probably had little if any commercial effect on the economy, mod-
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 968 F2d at 621 (declaring that because of "striking parallels between their activi-
ties and those of the temperance crusaders. .. the defendants' activities are not prohibited
by the Sherman Act.").
136 Nelson 0. Fitts, Note, A Critique of Noncommercial Justifications for Sherman Act
Violations, 99 Colum L Rev 478, 487 (1999).
137 One should also question the validity of attempting to discern legislative intent
from one Senator's statements when legislation is formed by the consent of both houses of
Congress. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533, 547-48
(1983) (discussing public choice theory and concluding that legislatures have only out-
comes, not intents), with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpret-
ing Statutes, 65 Cal L Rev 845, 863-67 (1992) (defending the use of legislative history as
an interpretive tool).
138 See Dinah R. PoKempner, Note, The Scope of Noerr Immunity for Direct-action
Protesters: Antitrust Meets the Anti-Abortionists, 89 Colum L Rev 662, 672 (1989) (arguing
that Sherman could not have conceived of violent charitable organizations and that he
thought temperance societies merely as benign as churches or schools).
139 Id.
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ern non-profits may be as commercial in character and effect as
any for-profit business. Interstate commerce in the past century
reveals "rapid sophistication of the American... econom[y] [that]
has undermined previously sturdy and visible distinctions be-
tween commercial enterprise and noncommercial or not-for-profit
endeavor[s] ."14' Recent case law illustrates this shift in the eco-
nomic involvement of non-profit or charitable organizations.
Since the Sherman Act's inception, courts have identified several
circumstances in which charitable or educational associations
have impermissibly restrained interstate commerce.14 1 Once a
plaintiff satisfies the interstate commerce requirement, holding
anti-abortion protesters liable for any anticompetitive effects they
may cause is not inconsistent with legislative intent.
D. Violent Protest Activities Impose Anticompetitive Restraints
on the Market
Congress enacted antitrust laws to prevent the harms that
unfair anticompetitive behavior inflicts upon consumers.' While
anti-abortion protest is by no means the only type of illegal pro-
test capable of causing anticompetitive harms,' it offers a prime
140 See Fitts, Note, 99 Colum L Rev at 478-79 (cited in note 136).
141 See NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85, 101 n 23
(1984) ("[G]ood motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice"); Ameri-
can Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc v Hydrolevel Corp, 456 US 556, 576 (1982)
(holding that non-profits can be held liable under antitrust laws); Blue Shield of Virginia v
McCready, 457 US 465, 472 (1982) (describing the Sherman Act as "comprehensive in its
terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by
w;homever they may be perpetrated"), quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc v American
Crystal Sugar Co, 334 US 219, 236 (1948); Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773, 787
(1975) ("[C]ongress intended §1 of the Sherman Act to embrace the widest array of conduct
possible.").
142 See Standard Oil Co v United States, 221 US 1, 58 (1911) ("treating as illegal all
contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions ... entered
into or done with the intent to do wrong to the general public and to limit the right of
individuals, thus restraining the free flow of commerce."). See also Bork, 9 J Law & Econ
at 7 (cited in note 51).
143 For example, typical environmental direct-action campaigns reveal the anticom-
petitive goal of hindering or halting business operations. In Huffman & Wright Logging
Co v Wade, 317 Ore 445, 857 P2d 101 (1993), protesters chained themselves to logging
equipment, causing shutdown of operations for most of the day. Id at 105. Environmental
activist groups engage in restraints of trade by "tree-sitting ... chaining protesters to
construction equipment, damaging roads, and tree-spiking," all with the ultimate goal of
causing the company to cease operations. Tree-spiking, a common practice among eco-
terrorists, involves driving metal spikes into trees, creating possibility of dangerous injury
from chainsaws if a worker subsequently encounters them when attempting to cut down
the tree. See Highland Enterprises, Inc v Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 335, 986 P2d 996, 1001
(1999).
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example of the devastating economic consequences these activi-
ties can pose to consumers and businesses.
1. Methods of restraints on competition.
Between 1977 and 1999, protesters perpetrated over 39
bombings, 99 acid attacks and 153 arsons against abortion pro-
viders.14 1 Seven physicians and clinic workers have been killed
since 1994, with sixteen attempted murders since 1991.14' Each
trespass or act of violence adversely affects the availability and
cost of medical services to consumers.
Other common anti-abortion activities that can operate as re-
straints on commerce include the following:
[P]hysical and verbal intimidation and threats directed at
health center personnel and patients; trespass upon and
damage to center property; blockades of centers; destruc-
tion of center advertising; ... false appointments to pre-
vent legitimate patients from making them; and direct in-
terference with [a] center['s] business relationships with
landlords, patients, personnel and medical laboratories. 46
Operation Rescue professes that its goal is to "'[pihysically
close down abortion mills' by encircling them with thousands of
protesters and blocking access to facilities."'47 While blockades
and intimidation can be addressed through the tort system, anti-
abortion protesters often resort to more violent and often criminal
tactics. Bombings14 and assassinations, 149 for example, regularly
144 See Kim Murphy, A Civil Action Becoming Doctors' Defense Weapon, LA Times Al
(Jan 13, 1999).
145 Id.
146 NOW v Scheidler, 968 F2d 612, 615 (7th Cir 1992). See also Operation Rescue v
Women's Health Center, Inc, 626 S2d 664, 668 (Fl 1993) (giving example of harassment by
anti-abortion protesters who are constantly "jamming its phone lines with multiple simul-
taneous calls"); National Abortion Federation, 1999 Year-End Analysis of Trends of Vio-
lence and Disruption Against Reproductive Health Care Clinics, available online at
<http://www.prochoice.org/Violence/Analysis1999.htm> (visited Oct 8, 2000) (reporting an
increase in bio-terrorism through use of hoax anthrax threats).
147 Women's Health Center, 626 S2d at 667 (quoting organization's literature).
148 See Mitchell Zuckoff, Feds Finding Antipathy, Not Bomb Suspect, In N.C., Boston
Globe Al (Nov 30, 1999).
149 See Michael A. Fletcher, Sniper Kills Abortion Doctor Near Buffalo: Police Had
Warned of Possible Attack, Wash Post Al (Oct 25, 1998) (discussing murder of New York
abortion doctor). See also Carol J. Castaneda, Abortion Providers 'In a War' Fatal Shoot-
ings Raise Level of Fear, USA Today 6A (Jan 5, 1995) ("In the wake of ... fatal shootings
... owners and operators across the USA are rushing to install metal detectors, bullet-
proof windows, and security cameras.").
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threaten the lives of employees and clients at clinics. Such acts of
violence also threaten the clinics' livelihood since the pervasive
atmosphere of fear makes retaining employees and attracting
clients difficult. 150
Beyond the extensive economic damage incurred from loss of
business due to the atmosphere of fear caused by these violent
acts, anti-abortion activists also utilize unique tactics to close
down clinics' business operations for long periods of time. For ex-
ample, activists have recently begun to use butyric acid to shut
down reproductive health providers.151 After a protester leaks the
chemical through a clinic's vents or doorways, the acid emits a
pungent odor.152 The chemical causes severe respiratory distress
and, in many cases, the employees and clients of the clinic require
hospitalization.153 Clinics frequently close for weeks to undergo
expensive cleaning, yet in many cases the odor lingers perma-
nently in the building.' Another tactic designed to cause ex-
tended shut-downs of clinics and deter clients is the "lock and
block" technique, where protesters pour glue in clinic locks and
chain themselves to clinic doors. 55
Anti-abortion protesters also use their relationships with
other businesses to harm abortion providers. For instance, the
defendants in Scheidler contacted medical and office supply com-
panies that serviced abortion providers and "threatened to dis-
rupt and harass them if they continued to transact business with
the centers."'56
Finally, anti-abortion activists attempt to dissuade women
from entering abortion clinics. The National Right to Life Com-
150 National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), Clinic Violence, Intimidation
and Terrorism, available online at <http://www.naral.org/mediaresources/fact/terrorism.
html> (visited Oct 8, 2000) (quoting a clinic director as stating "[wie had this absolutely
fantastic candidate for a front-desk job . .. . [sIhe was ready to accept ... but ... [sihe
talked to her friends and family and decided she could not live with that kind of fear"),
citiing National Abortion Federation (NAF), NAF Violence & Disruption Statistics, Oct
1998 (cited in note 2).
151 See Melissa Healy, FBI Probing Acid Attacks at Abortion Clinics, LA Times A12
(July 19, 1998).
152 See 139 Cong Rec S 15658 (Nov 16, 1993) (statement of Senator Kennedy) ("Acid to
make staff and patients ill is sprayed into the clinic, where it seeps into carpets and furni-
ture. The clinic is forced to shut down for days or weeks while it undergoes an expensive
cleanup.").
153 Id.
154 See Healy, FBI Probing Acid Attacks at Abortion Clinics, LA Times at A12 (cited in
note 151) ("Many clinics were closed for weeks until hazardous-materials cleanup crews
could be called in and exposed surfaces could be replaced.").
155 Scheidler, 968 F2d at 615.
156 Id at 616.
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mittee reports that approximately three thousand "Crisis Preg-
nancy Centers" exist in the U.S., as an alternative to abortion,
"providing pregnancy tests and counseling ... offer[ing] a full
range of services, helping women obtain housing, maternity and
baby clothes ... information about adoption, and even advice on
how a woman in school can continue her education.""7 In this ca-
pacity, anti-abortion protesters appear to be in direct competition
in the market for reproductive health services.158
2. Anticompetitive effects of illegal direct-action protests.
The many tactics utilized by the anti-abortion movement
have produced sustained anticompetitive effects on the market
for abortion services. In Northeast Women's Center59 the district
court issued a directed verdict against the plaintiffs' antitrust
claim because they did not explicate any anticompetitive effects
caused by the protesters.6 ' However, the court provided a road-
map for what effects would sufficiently maintain a Sherman Act
§ 1 claim, stating that "[a]n injury to competition within an in-
dustry may be proven by an appreciable reduction in the number
of competitors or by some other outward sign of adverse effects on
competitive conditions."16' Examining anti-abortion protest activi-
ties through an economic lens reveals heightened barriers to en-
try, increased costs of operation, and decreased numbers of com-
petitors.
Anti-abortionists often explicitly announce their intent to
raise clinics' costs above the natural price determined by the
marketplace. An example can be found in the "Army of God Man-
ual,"162 the seminal work of the anti-abortion movement in the
1990s. The editor, known only by the alias "the Mad Gluer," sug-
gests the use of locks, chains, glues, and acids as a part of "Op-
157 See National Right to Life Committee, Abortion: Some Medical Facts; Alternatives
to Abortion, available online at <http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/ASMF/asmfl5.html> (visited
Oct 8, 2000).
158 Case law supports the contention the direct competition between plaintiffs and
defendants in an antitrust suit is not required. See II C 1.
159 670 F Supp 1300 (E D Pa 1987).
160 Id at 1305.
161 Id at 1304-05 (emphasis added).
162 See Army of God, 99 Covert Ways to Stop Abortion, formerly available online at
<http//www.armyofgod.com/AOGsel5.html> (visited Apr 30, 2000). See also The Abortion
Rights Activist, available online at <http://www.cais.com/agm.main/aog99way.htm> (vis-
ited Oct 8, 2000) (citing excerpts from the Army of God manual); David Samuels, The
Making of a Fugitive, NY Times §5 at 47 (Mar 21, 1999) (describing the manual as "a
handbook for violent action that would shape the movement in the decade to come").
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eration B.R.I.C.K.," or "Babies Rescued Through Increased Cost
of Killing."'63
Barriers to entry for small firms may be imposed by the
added costs of providing security or paying for damages caused by
these incidents. Due to anti-abortion violence,
Clinics are spending thousands of dollars on bulletproof
glass, armed guards, security cameras, metal detectors,
and other security measures. Doctors are wearing bullet-
proof vests and arming themselves .... Some have even
purchased armored vehicles.'
Due to the skyrocketing costs of maintaining a clinic, the only
abortion providers that may be able to survive are large hospitals
with financial resources to invest in expensive security
measures.'65 Smaller, less well-established abortion providers will
be most vulnerable to the anticompetitive effects of protest.'66
3. Anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.
In order to bring a successful claim a plaintiff must not only
show the anticompetitive effects of the defendants' behavior, he
must also prove that that behavior reduced competition in the
relevant market.6 v First, the product market must be defined.
Here, the relevant product market consists of abortion services
163 See Samuels, The Making of a Fugitive, NY Times § 5 at 47 (cited in note 162).
164 National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), Clinic Violence, Intimidation
and Terrorism, <http://www.naral.orgtmediaresources/fact/terrorism.html> (visited Oct 8,
2000).
165 See PoKempner, Note, 89 Colum L Rev at 678 (1989) (cited in note 138).
166 Id. See also Pearson, How to Start and Operate Your Own Pro-Life Outreach Crisis
Pregnancy Centers at 5 (cited in note 111) (advising entrepreneurs to rent office space in
the same building as clinics so "if the girl who would be going to the abortion chamber sees
your office first with a similar name, she will probably come into your center"; that way
"the abortion chamber is paying for advertising to bring the girl to you").
167 Some debate exists as to whether plaintiffs in a Sherman Act § 1 suit need to dis-
tinguish the relevant geographic market. See SCFC ILC Inc v Visa USA, Inc, 36 F3d 958,
965 n 10 (10th Cir 1994) (holding that § 1 involves conduct that does not alter the market
structure); United States v Yellow Cab Co, 336 US 218, 225-26 (1947) (stating that § 1
claims only require proof that some appreciable part of intrastate commerce was subject to
the effects of the conspiracy). But see Coniglio v Highwood Services, Inc, 495 F2d 1286,
1292 (2d Cir 1974), concurring with American Aloe Corp v Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc,
420 F2d 1248 (7th Cir 1970), cert denied, 398 US 929 (1970) ("[B]efore there can be a
conclusion as to whether there has been ... a contract in restraint of trade, a determina-
tion must be made as to what are the relevant product markets within which to gauge a
firm's power or the effect of its activities."). See generally Kintner, 2 Federal Antitrust
Law § 16.4 (Anderson 1980) (cited in note 19) (describing difference between market defi-
nition in § 1 and § 2 actions).
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provided mostly by clinics and hospitals. However, the product
market may be expanded to include "reasonably interchangeable"
services.16  The recent FDA approval of RU-486169 may broaden
the relevant product market. The drug's potential as a substitute
for surgical abortion depends on the availability and cost of the
drug-factors which are yet to be determined.17 ° Further, violent
anti-abortion protest might also detrimentally affect the avail-
ability of the abortion pill. Regardless, a court faced with an anti-
trust claim will need to account for RU-486 when analyzing the
relevant produce market definition. Since the drug may only be
used through the seventh week of pregnancy, 7' abortion services
provided after the seventh week-surgical abortions conducted in
clinics or hospitals-remain a distinct product market.
After identifying the relevant product market, a plaintiff
must demonstrate anticompetitive effects on the product in the
relevant geographic market. In United States v Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank,'72 the Court noted that in market definition analysis
the proper question is "not where the parties . .. do business or
even where they compete, but where, within the area of competi-
tive overlap, the effect ... on competition will be direct and im-
mediate."173 The Court cited inconvenience and high transporta-
tion costs as factors limiting the geographic scope of the relevant
market. 174
Whether or not this reduction sufficiently constitutes reduced
competition in a particular market will depend on the circum-
stances of individual cases.175 Protest activities at an urban clinic,
168 For product market definition, see Brown Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294, 325
(1962) ("The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable in-
terchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and
substitutes for it.").
169 See Gina Kolata, U.S. Approves Abortion Pill, NY Times Al (Sept 29, 2000).
170 See David J. Garrow, Now, Another Pill Promises a Revolution, NY Times 3 (Oct 1,
2000) ("[A]bortion-rights advocates predict that, over time, far more physicians will ad-
minister [RU-486] than presently offer surgical abortion.").
171 Kolata, U.S. Approves Abortion Pill, NY Times at Al (cited in note 169).
172 374 US 321 (1963).
173 Id at 357.
174 Id at 358.
175 See United States v Pabst Brewing Co, 384 US 546, 549 (1966) (stating that market
definition "does not call for the delineation of a 'section of the country' by metes and
bounds as a surveyor would lay off a plot of ground .... Congress did not seem troubled
about the exact spot competition might be lessened; it simply intended to outlaw mergers
which threatened competition in any or all parts of the country"). Pabst was modified in
United States v Marine Bancorporation, Inc, 418 US 602, 621 n 20 (1974) (holding that
Pabst merely stood for "the proposition that here may be more than one relevant geo-
graphic market....").
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where consumers can easily find several other providers, may not
constitute an anticompetitive effect under § 1. In contrast, protest
activities that eliminate a rural abortion provider may create a
significant reduction in the availability of abortion services to
consumers. 176
A plaintiff that establishes reduced availability of abortion
services in their relevant market satisfies Northeast Women's
Center's requirement of demonstrating anticompetitive effects. 177
Plaintiffs will likely be able to meet their burden of showing anti-
competitive effects in relevant geographic markets, as the last
decade reveals an appreciable reduction in the overall number of
abortion providers. 7 s In 1982, 2,908 doctors offered abortion
services in the United States.179 By 1996 there were only
2,042"'°-a 30 percent drop. As a result, citizens in over 80 per-
cent of the counties in the United States do not currently have
access to abortion services.'' Across the United States, 95 per-
cent of non-metropolitan counties lack an abortion provider.'82
Medical students electing not to practice abortions for fear of
violent reprisals exacerbate the current shortage of abortion
service providers. 8 3 As a result, "it is now harder to get an abor-
tion than it has been at any time in the last 20 years."
8 4
176 See Philadelphia National Bank, 374 US at 357.
177 670 F Supp 1300, 1304 (E D Pa 1987). See note 89 and accompanying text.
178 This is accompanied by a marked decline in the occurrence of abortion. See The
Alan Guttmacher Institute, Induced Abortion, available online at <http://www.agi-
usa.org/pubs/fbinduced-abortion.html> (visited Oct 8, 2000) (noting that in 1990 an es-
timated 1.61 million abortions took place, while 1.37 million occurred in 1996). In deter-
mining the viability of a plaintiff's antitrust claim, courts should analyze whether the
decline in abortion occurrence resulted from anticompetitive conduct that reduced the
number of abortion providers or simply a lessened demand for abortion services in the
relevant geographic market.
179 Marilynn Marchione, Controversy Makes Private Practice Public for Madison Doc-
tor, Milwaukee J Sent All (Apr 11, 1999). See also National Abortion Rights Action
League, Clinic Violence, Intimidation and Terrorism, available online at <http://www.
naral.org/mediaresources/factlterrorism.html> (visited Oct 8, 2000), citing National Abor-
tion Federation, "NAF Violence & Disruption Statistics," Oct 1998 (describing similar
trends in the declining number of doctors and service providers) (cited in note 2).
180 Marchione, Controversy Makes Private Practice Public for Madison Doctor, Mil-
waukee J Sent All (Apr 11) (cited in note 179).
181 Id (citing 86 percent); 139 Cong Rec S 15655 (Nov 16, 1993) (statement of Senator
Kennedy) (citing eighty-three percent).
182 See NARAL, Clinic Violence, Intimidation and Terrorism, available online at
<http://www.naral.org/mediaresources/fact/terrorism.html> (visited Oct 8, 2000), citing
Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States, 1995-1996, 30
Family Planning Perspectives 263, 266 (Nov/Dec 1998).
183 Gonnerman, Terrorist Campaign Against Abortion, Village Voice at 36 (cited in
note 110) (reporting that Head of Life Dynamics Inc., Texas businessman Mark Crutcher
published and mailed a "joke" book to medical students and doctors, which included the
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As outlined above, anti-abortion activity meets the formal le-
gal requirements for Sherman Act § 1 liability. Though courts can
apply antitrust laws, the more important issue is whether they
should.
III. FAILURE OF OTHER REMEDIES TO ADDRESS ANTICOMPETITIVE
EFFECTS OF DIRECT-ACTION PROTEST
The primary purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect con-
sumers from the evils of an anticompetitive, monopolistic
market."5 As the Supreme Court stated in Northern Pacific Rail-
way v United States, the Sherman Act "was designed to be a com-
prehensive charter of economic liberty, aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition ... [which] will yield the best alloca-
tion of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality, and the greatest material progress."" 6 Keeping these
goals in mind, "there is no reason to believe that as a rule morally
or religiously motivated trade restraints will damage consumer
welfare to a lesser degree than economically motivated ones." 87
The failure of other laws to account for the systemic loss of reve-
nues and devastating anticompetitive effects borne by consumers
and abortion providers necessitates antitrust liability for anti-
abortion protest.
Direct-action protest can be divided into three categories,
each with varying degrees of First Amendment protection and
social value.' "Category 1" protest activities-such as peaceful
picketing and leaflet distribution-receive, complete First
Amendment protection. 89 "Category 2" includes illegal but non-
violent actions such as trespass, blockades or verbal threats.
These activities may possess some degree of social value as forms
line: "Q: What would you do in you found yourself in a room with Hitler, Mussolini and an
abortionist, and you had a gun with only two bullets?; A: Shoot the abortionist twice.").
184 Egan, Roots of Terror, NY Times at 1 (cited in note 112).
185 See Standard Oil Co v FTC, 340 US 231, 248-49 (1951) (stating that Congress
intended to protect consumers with the Sherman Act).
186 356 US 1, 4-5 (1958).
187 PoKempner, Note, 89 Colum L Rev at 667 (cited in note 138).
188 Faye Clayton and Sara N. Love, attorneys for the plaintiffs in NOW v Scheidler,
identified three forms of direct-action protest in the facts of the case: "[1] Abortion oppo-
nents who protested outside the clinics ran the gamut from lawful protesters who prayed,
sang, and passed out leaflets, to [2] lawful but obnoxious protesters who screamed 'mur-
derer' and 'baby-killer,' to [31 outright thugs who physically assaulted the women and the
clinic escorts and barricaded the doors." Clayton and Love, 62 Alb L Rev at 927 n 27 (cited
in note 83).
189 See Steven E. Soule and Karen R. Weinstein, Recent Developments: Racketeering,
Anti-Abortion Protesters, and the First Amendment, 4 UCLA Women's L J 365, 387 (1994).
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of civil disobedience, but they do not receive First Amendment
protection. 9 ° Finally, "Category 3" activities-organized efforts to
intimidate others by violent or otherwise unlawful means-enjoy
no First Amendment shield from regulation. 9' Due to the sys-
temic economic damages generated by anti-abortion groups, none
of the existing criminal or civil remedies sufficiently compensates
businesses and consumers for anticompetitive harms that Cate-
gory 2 and 3 activities inflict on the market.
A. Application of Criminal Statutes
Criminal laws directed at specific acts of violence offer some
relief from the damage caused by illegal direct-action protesters.
However, criminal sentences for arsons, bombings and murder
punish only the individual actor, not the umbrella organization
culpable for orchestrating the crime.'92 Additionally, in many in-
stances state police forces lack the resources to prosecute all of
the legal violations that occur at large protests.9 '
While an arsonist or bomber would likely receive a substan-
tial penalty, the small fines typically imposed for such crimes as
trespass prove largely ineffective in deterring resolute anti-
abortion activists.' Furthermore, many anti-abortion protesters
hide their assets to avoid paying large monetary judgments.'95 As
one defendant quipped: "All you gotta do is keep closing [P.O.]
boxes and opening new ones, and cash your checks at places other
than banks."'96 Collecting monetary damages proves equally diffi-
cult against individuals who make themselves judgment proof by
declaring bankruptcy.'97 Furthermore, mere criminal punishment
190 Id. See also Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amend-
ment, 19 Hofstra L Rev 67, 67-68 (1990) ("Civil disobedience ... is expressive conduct
even the participants admit is not protected by the First Amendment.").
'9' See Part IV A 1.
192 See Egan, The Roots of Terror, NY Times at 1 (cited in note 112) ("While Federal
officials have been frustrated in trying to prove a criminal conspiracy, lawsuits against
some of the same people who have been Federal targets have had more success in per-
suadingjuries of a civil conspiracy.").
193 See Michael Wines, Whose Freedom First? Congress Moves to Deter Abortion Clinic
Attacks, NY Times 2 (May 15, 1994) (discussing how anti-abortion protests often over-
whelm local police departments).
194 See Kim Cobb, How to Grow a Revolution, Houston Chron at A16 (cited in note 117)
("Most arrests at Operation Rescue events result from trespass charges.").
195 Egan, Roots of Terror, NY Times 1 (cited at note 112).
196 Id (quoting one of the leaders of Operation Rescue in Texas, ordered to pay Planned
Parenthood $1 million for civil conspiracy).
197 See NARAL, Enforcing Clinic Protection Laws to Their Fullest Potential, available
online at <http://www.naral.org/mediaresources/factlbankruptcy.html> (visited Oct 8,
354 [2000:
ANTiTRUST AND ANTI-ABORTION PROTEST
of individual actors will fail to fully compensate damaged busi-
nesses. Without a solvent organization as a codefendant, gener-
ating an amount commensurate to the harm inflicted by anticom-
petitive tactics becomes impossible. However, an antitrust suit
against an organization that is guilty of inflicting anticompetitive
effects on the abortion services market could reach the larger pool
of an organization's funding.
B. RICO
Under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act.9 ("RICO"), a plaintiff can recover treble damages,
attorney's fees,199 and injunctive relief, including the right of the
court to order the dissolution or reorganization of any
enterprise."' The government may also prosecute the defendant
to impose criminal penalties.20 ' Since NOW v Scheidler, substan-
tial opposition has arisen in response to the Supreme Court's
elimination of an economic motive requirement for RICO viola-
tions." ' The House of Representatives considered a bill in 1998,
the Civil RICO Clarification Act, that would have effectively re-
versed Scheidler by eliminating the extortion predicate for
RICO. 0 3 Professor Robert Blakely, RICO's original drafter, con-
tends that the statute was "never intended to have any impact on
any kind of demonstrations, pro-abortion or anti-abortion, pro-
war or anti-war, pro-trees or anti-trees," concluding that "RICO
doesn't belong in those areas."0 4 The application of RICO to anti-
1999) (arguing that Bankruptcy Code should be amended to make debts resulting from
clinic violence non-dischargeable).
198 18 USC § 1964 (1994).
199 See 18 USC § 1964(c).
200 See 18 USC § 1964(a).
201 See 18 USC § 1963 (1994).
202 510 US 249, 252 (1994) (holding economic motive irrelevant to finding of RICO
liability).
203 See Hearing of the Crime Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee: RICO
Applications, Federal News Service (July 17, 1998).
204 Joan I. Duffy, McClellan's RICO Reaches Far and Wide, Commercial Appeal B1
(May 3, 1999).
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abortion activists has also sparked lively scholarly dialogue. °5
Despite this contentious debate, courts continue to apply RICO." 6
RICO, a law designed to root out the insidious underbelly of
organized crime, can reach only a limited amount of anticompeti-
tive protest activity.2 ' Because of RICO's emphasis on criminal
conspiracy, the statute may only apply to violent and constitu-
tionally indefensible Category 3 activity. Further, trespass cannot
serve as a predicate offense to substantiate RICO liability.0 8
Since the most common type of anti-abortion protest involves
trespass and blockades,0 9 this limitation on RICO poses a sub-
stantial impediment to the recovery of economic losses.
Civil RICO claims offer treble damage remedies,210 similar to
antitrust laws.21' But because antitrust law mandates a more so-
phisticated damage calculation involving economic analysis, it
could more accurately identify the harm protesters cause to the
plaintiff's business and to the market as a whole.212 Furthermore,
it is unlikely that private plaintiffs could overcome RICO's crimi-
205 See Matt Moore, Note, RICO Run Amok: The Supreme Court Sends a Message, 63
UMKC L Rev 185, 186 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court sabotaged the statute in
order to force the legislature to narrow the statute to original intent of organized crime);
Peter Burke, Note, Application of RICO to Political Protest Activity: An Analogy to the
Antitrust Laws, 12 J L & Pol 573, 574 (1996) (contending that RICO should receive only
limited application in context of political and social protest).
206 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/ Willamette, Inc v American Coalition of
Life Activists, 945 F Supp 1355 (D Oregon 1996) (holding that FACE and RICO claims
were properly brought).
207 See Loren E. Kalish, Comment, Plaintiffs in Complicity: Should there be an Inno-
cent Party Requirement for Civil Rico Actions?, 47 Emory L J 785, 804-05 (1998) ("Con-
gress intended for RICO to reach particularly loathsome conduct, not merely anticompeti-
tive behavior ... . RICO has more intense criminal overtones [than antitrust]."); Lisa
Pritchard Bailey, et al, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 36 Am Crim L
Rev 1035, 1036-37 (1999) ("RICO's purpose is to remove organized crime from the legiti-
mate business community.").
208 Feminist Women's Health Center v Roberts, 1988 US Dist Lexis 16325, 14 ("Plain-
tiffs have failed to show that trespass may serve as a predicate offence under § 1961(1)
since defendant could not have been charged with a trespass offense carrying a penalty of
more than one year.").
209 See Kim Cobb, How to Grow a Revolution, Houston Chron at A16 (cited in note
117).
210 18 USC § 1964(c) ("Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.").
211 15 USC § 15 (1994) ("[Alny person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reasons of anything forbidden by the antitrust laws may sue therefore ... , and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.").
212 See Kintner, 1 Federal Antitrust Law § 1.16 at 38 (citing greater influence of
economists and economic theory resulting in "[i]ncreasingly sophisticated" antitrust appli-
cation) (cited in note 26).
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nal emphasis213 and achieve broad recovery for marketplace inju-
ries. As one author notes, "RICO is more concerned with compen-
sating victims than it is with maintaining a competitive econ-
omy."
214
C. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE)
In response to anti-abortion violence, Congress enacted the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act in 1994 to pro-
vide civil and criminal remedies for "violent, threatening, ob-
structive and destructive conduct that is intended to injure, in-
timidate or interfere with persons seeking to obtain or provide
reproductive health services."215
FACE's power to remedy the economic damages caused by
anti-abortion protest is limited. In United States v Unterburger,216
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
two defendants who chained themselves to the main entrance of a
clinic, causing it to shut down for several hours until police re-
moved them.217 Although they faced a maximum of six months in
prison and a $10,000 fine under FACE, the defendants were sen-
tenced to time served.218 In another case, eleven defendants were
convicted for blocking a clinic entrance.219 The court sentenced
two defendants to four months' imprisonment, two others to two
months' imprisonment, and the remaining seven to time served
and community service.2 Each of the defendants paid $105 resti-
tution for the value of damaged doors.221 Neither conviction com-
pensated for larger economic damages likely caused by the loss of
business revenues and consumer goodwill.
However, FACE does not rule out the use of other statutory
remedies, as "nothing in this section shall be construed ... to
limit any existing legal remedies for such interference."222 If used
in conjunction with antitrust laws, remedies imposed under
213 See note 207.
214 Kalish, 47 Emory L J at 804 (cited in note 207).
215 18 USC §248(2) (1994) (containing congressional statement of purpose).
216 97 F3d 1413 (11th Cir 1996).
217 Id at 1415.
218 Id. See also United States v Bird, 1997 US App Lexis 33988 *52 (5th Cir) (uphold-
ing defendant's sentence of one year's imprisonment and $820.67 restitution for repeated
death threats and throwing a bottle through the window of a car being driven by an abor-
tion doctor).
219 See United States v Weslin, 156 F3d 292, 298 (2d Cir 1998) (upholding convictions).
220 See id.
221 See id.
222 See 18 USC § 248(d)(2) (1994).
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FACE can more accurately approximate the financial injury in-
flicted on individual business owners and the anticompetitive
harm wrecked on the market.
D. Antitrust Remedies
Regardless of the availability of other remedies, nothing pre-
cludes supplementary use of antitrust laws." 3 Section 4 of the
Clayton Act 24 authorizes the provision of attorney's fees and
treble damages for injuries suffered by reason of violation of the
antitrust laws. These provisions allow ample opportunity for
companies to recover the monetary damages incurred from these
attacks and for the government to protect the public interest by
deterring perpetrators from continuing to distort the market
through illegal and coercive tactics. 5
IV. NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY AND FIRST AMENDMENT
CONCERNS DO NOT BAR APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO
DIRECT-ACTION PROTEST
The First Amendment guarantees "the freedom of speech...
and [the right] to petition the government for redress of griev-
ances."22s This guarantee provides the basis of Noerr-Pennington
immunity from antitrust liability.2 7 Recognizing the need to pre-
serve citizens' right to petition, the Supreme Court inferred this
exemption from the legislative history of the Sherman Act.22 An-
titrust regulation of direct-action protest thus implicates the
First Amendment's general protection for freedom of speech.
Both Noerr and the First Amendment prohibit antitrust ap-
plication to Category 1 protest-peaceful picketing-as it consti-
tutes both a "reasonably" directed attempt to petition the gov-
223 See Joseph P. Bauer, 11 Kintner, Federal Antitrust Law § 78.4 at 14 (1998) ("As
long as the Defendant's conduct in violation of the antitrust laws has given rise to 'mate-
rial' harm to the plaintiff, causation is shown and antitrust relief will be available, even
though that conduct might also give rise to a state law claim."); Mulvey v Samuel Goldwyn
Prods, 433 F2d 1073, 1075-76 (9th Cir 1970) (holding that where conduct in violation of
antitrust laws harmed other party, the fact that the plaintiff might also have sued for
breach of contract is irrelevant).
224 15 USC § 15 (1994).
225 See Part V A-B.
226 US Const Amend I.
227 See Part I C.
228 See Eastern Railroad Presidents' Conference v Noerr Motor Frieght, Inc, 365 US
127, 144-45 (1961) (holding that railroad companies' conspiracy to place restraints on
trucking did not violate antitrust laws because their actions were designed to prompt
government action).
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ernment 29 and a monumentally important form of speech in our
democracy. 20 Neither doctrine immunizes Category 3 protest-
violent activities such as bombings, assaults, or murders.231 How-
ever, Category 2 protest-admittedly illegal activity that argua-
bly possesses some First Amendment value-can and should be
reached by antitrust laws in some circumstances.
A. Noerr Does Not Immunize Certain Direct-action Protests from
Antitrust Liability
1. Noerr immunity and violent "Category 3" activity.
Category 3 acts do not fall within the Noerr exception be-
cause the First Amendment offers no protection for violent activi-
ties. The Supreme Court has differentiated between valid and
invalid forms of petitioning, asserting that "violence has no sanc-
tuary in the First Amendment, and the use of weapons, gunpow-
der, and gasoline may not constitutionally masquerade under the
guise of advocacy."232 The Court recently affirmed this distinction,
announcing that "[viiolence or other types of potentially expres-
sive activities that produce special harms distinct from their
communicative impact ... are entitled to no constitutional pro-
tection."233 For these cases, when violence operates as a "restraint
of trade" that creates anticompetitive effects, courts should pre-
scribe antitrust liability.234
2. Noerr, civil disobedience and "Category 2"
protest activity.
Category 2 protests may or may not receive Noerr immunity.
Blockades and trespass are the most common forms of anti-
abortion protest;235 they have never received absolute First
Amendment protection merely because of their political
229 See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc v Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc, 508
US 49, 56-57 (1993).
230 See note 68.
231 See Part II D 1.
232 NAACP v Claiborne Hardware, Co, 458 US 886, 916 (1982), quoting Samuels v
Mackwell, 401 US 66, 75 (1971) (Douglas concurring).
233 Wisconsin v Mitchell, 508 US 476, 484 (1993), quoting Roberts v US Jaycees, 468
US 609, 628 (1984).
234 See Fischel, 45 U Chi L Rev at 100 (cited at note 16) (arguing that activity should
be constitutionally defensible to fall under Noerr).
235 See Cobb, How to Grow a Revolution, Houston Chron at A16 (cited in note 117).
329] 359
360 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2000:
content." 6 However, potential chilling effects on free speech give
rise to a strong argument against the use of antitrust laws to en-
join protest activities. 37 Several authors reject stringent regula-
tion of protest activities because civil disobedience has histori-
cally contributed to free speech."' Important historical forms of
civil disobedience include the abolitionist movement, the cam-
paign for women's suffrage, the civil rights movement, and the
anti-Vietnam War protests.3 '
Civil disobedience is illegal, non-violent, open conduct such
that "the participant intend[s] ... the community to take notice
of the illegal action ... [and] the participant ... [is] willing to
accept punishment."24 ° In the anti-abortion context the activity
usually only amounts to trespass, blockades, property damage,
noise violations, or verbal assaults for which courts impose fines.
Despite their possible expressive value, Category 2 protest activi-
ties that accompany violent Category 3 acts constitute illegiti-
mate and predatory conduct that antitrust laws should
condemn.241 Further, a protest consisting solely of illegal but non-
violent Category 2 activity ameliorates concerns about chilling
legitimate Category 1 protest.242
236 See Cameron v Johnson, 390 US 611, 617 (1968) (upholding against a First
Amendment challenge a prohibition on picketing that "obstructs or unreasonably inter-
feres with ingress or egress to or from the courthouse"); Cox v Louisiana, 379 US 536, 555
(1965) (holding that a group of demonstrators had no First Amendment "right to cordon off
... [an] entrance to a public ... building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree to
listen to their exhortations"); New York State National Organization for Women, Inc v
Terry, 886 F2d 1339, 1364 (2d Cir 1989) ("[B]locking access to public and private buildings
has never been upheld as a proper method of communication in an orderly society.").
237 See generally Bryn K. Larsen, Note, RICO's Application to Non-economic Actors: A
Serious Threat to First Amendment Freedoms, 14 Rev Litig 707, 708 (1995) (predicting
that holding anti-abortion groups and other political organizations liable under RICO may
lead to infringements of free speech); John P. Barry, Note, When Protesters Become 'Rack-
eteers,'RICO Runs Afoul of the First Amendment, 64 St John's L Rev 889 (1990) (arguing
that RICO application will chill free speech); Ledewitz, 19 Hofstra L Rev at 68-69 (cited in
note 190).
238 See for example Ledewitz, 19 Hofstra L Rev at 73-82 (cited in note 190) (discussing
history of civil disobedience and concluding that "civil disobedience is justified at least
some of the time"), and Brian T. Murray, Note, Protesters, Exortion, and Coercion: Pre-
venting RICO from Chilling First Amendment Freedoms, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 691, 694
(1999) (arguing that the "line between protected and unprotected protest is vague" and
needs to be preserved).
239 See Carolyn Grose, Note: "Put Your Body On the Line:" Civil Disobedience and
Injunctions, 59 Brooklyn L Rev 1497, 1502-03 (1994) (arguing that the imminent and
probably irreparable harm caused by a 1987 Operation Rescue protest warranted the
issuance of an injunction).
240 Ledewitz, 19 Hofstra L Rev at 70-71 (1990) (cited in note 190).
241 See Parts IV A 1-2.
242 It is unlikely this will occur, since the majority of anti-abortion protests involve
peaceful picketing.
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One ground on which Category 2 behavior may receive Noerr
immunity arises from the facts of Noerr itself. In Noerr, the Court
granted immunity despite the fact that both parties had engaged
in a fraudulent publicity campaign.2 43 Though the publicity cam-
paign constituted an illegal act, the Court denied antitrust liabil-
ity because of countervailing First Amendment concerns. Under
the same principle, non-violent Category 2 activity, such as tor-
tious interference with a clinic's business relationships, could not
alone support antitrust liability when outweighed by First
Amendment interests in protecting Category 1 peaceful protests.
Courts should also consider whether protesters exclusively
practicing Category 2 tactics may be held liable for antitrust vio-
lations. For example, suppose an anti-abortion organization con-
ducted no blockades, vigils or demonstrations outside clinics. In-
stead, it directed its campaign against abortion through harass-
ing telephone calls to the clinic and the clinic's medical suppliers.
Without any legitimate petitioning activity in need of protection,
do the First Amendment concerns embodied in Noerr remain?
An easier case for antitrust liability arises when Category 2
and Category 3 protest activities combine. This type of protest is
not "reasonably directed" at attaining government relief and thus
would fall under the "sham" exception to Noerr.24 In NOW v
Scheidler the Seventh Circuit explicitly disallowed the anti-
abortion defendant's claim to Noerr immunity, stating that
"[a]lthough the defendants' acts generated publicity which they
may have hoped would influence government actors, this tangen-
tial contact is not sufficient to invoke First Amendment protec-
tion for otherwise criminal behavior. 245
Where illegal Category 2 and Category 3 protest activities
are only "tangentially" related to legitimate petitioning, courts
should find that the protest constitutes a "sham" petition. In
California Motor Transport Co v Trucking Unlimited,24 the Court
identified four unethical means of obtaining government redress
which made the defendants ineligible for Noerr immunity, in-
cluding: perjury of witnesses; using fraudulent patents; conspir-
243 Noerr, 365 US at 129-30 ("[D]efendants utilized the so-called third-party technique
... the publicity matter circulated in the campaign was made to appear as spontaneously
expressed views of independent persons and civic groups when, in fact, it was largely
prepared ... and paid for by the railroads.").
244 See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc, 508 US at 60 (establishing objectively
reasonable standard).
245 NOW v Scheidler, 968 F2d 612, 616 (7th Cir 1992).
246 404 US 508 (1972).
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ing with licensing authorities; and bribery of public agents.247
Trespass, blockades, and threats-activities fitting squarely
within Category 2 protest-present far more serious dangers
than the activities the Court found to negate petitioning immu-
nity in California Motor Transport.248 Indeed, the Court noted
that the four-item list is not exclusive, as "many other forms of
illegal and reprehensible practice ... may corrupt the adminis-
trative or judicial processes, [and] which may result in antitrust
violations."249 Bombings, sabotage and acid attacks-activities
falling within Category 3-pose heightened dangers and thus
should also rule out the availability of the petitioning doctrine.
Summarily, Category 1 activity should never be used as a ba-
sis for antitrust liability. Category 2 behavior, however, may be
actionable if no Category 1 protest exists to raise First Amend-
ment concerns. Finally, Category 3 activity is always unpro-
tected, and alone or in combination with Category 2 protests, it
should be fully actionable under antitrust laws.
B. Applying the Antitrust Laws to Certain Anti-Abortion
Protests Comports with First Amendment Principles
While Noerr remains the relevant test for determining peti-
tioning immunity from the antitrust laws, the punishment of
combined Category 2 and Category 3 protests must also pass con-
stitutional- muster under the First Amendment. 2" The anti-
abortion protest activities that are not precluded from First
Amendment protection by their violent nature can still be pro-
scribed if a regulation "furthers an important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restric-
247 Id at 512-13 (holding that defendants had conspired to put plaintiffs out of busi-
ness by instigation of federal and state lawsuits to limit plaintiff's access to courts).
248 See Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reas-
sessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 Hastings L J 905, 909 (1990) (arguing that
predatory methods of petitioning that distort and corrupt the process of government
should not receive Noerr immunity).
249 California Motor Transport Co, 404 US at 513.
250 But see Bauer, 11 Kintner, Federal Antitrust Law § 77.1 at 187 (cited in note 223)
(noting uncertainty in the law as to whether Noerr is constitutionally or statutorily based:
"If the basis is constitutional, then courts construing Noerr-Pennington would look to the
underlying policies of the First Amendment and the many decisions interpreting it. If on
the other hand, the basis is statutory.., the exemption could be. .. broader than ... the
limits compelled by the First Amendment.").
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tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest."251
Antitrust laws present a type of content-neutral regulation
that, when applied to the conduct of anti-abortion protesters,
would not infringe upon First Amendment rights. First, applica-
tion of antitrust laws would further an important governmental
interest by assuring a fair and competitive marketplace.252 Sec-
ond, the governmental interest of antitrust regulation lies in the
realization of a fair and competitive marketplace. Any restric-
tions on speech are unrelated to the overarching purpose of the
law. In United States v O'Brien,25 the Court found the govern-
ment's interest in preventing draft-card burning to be "unrelated
to suppression of expression because it applied to the destruction
of the cards for any reason or for no reason."254 Similarly, the gov-
ernment's stake in suppressing anticompetitive behavior remains
the same whether a group attempts to force an abortion provider
out of business because the group is morally opposed to abortion
or because the group wishes to be the only abortion provider in a
particular market. Finally, an antitrust action would not apply to
purely non-violent, peaceful protest.2 5 As such, incidental restric-
tions on free speech would not be any greater than necessary to
protect competitive interests.
Thus, the paramount importance of free speech and civil dis-
obedience to our political culture can still be reconciled with the
attachment of antitrust liability to certain direct-action protests.
As noted above, the First Amendment does not shelter violent
protest activities from regulation. 5 Though civil disobedience
may be an important method of addressing sociopolitical con-
cerns, victims should not be required to shoulder the damages.
Courts can both remedy antitrust violations and at the same time
preserve activities of protected status. Achieving these goals si-
multaneously involves carefully parsing out the illegitimate
251 United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 377 (1968).
252 See United States v Topco Associates, Inc, 405 US 596, 610 (1972) (describing the
Sherman Act to be as "important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fmdamental personal
freedoms").
253 391 US at 377.
254 Id at 375.
255 See NAACP v Claiborne Hardware Co, 458 US 886, 915-16 (1982) (holding NAACP
not liable under antitrust laws for losses caused by non-violent elements of a political
boycott).
256 See Part IV A 1.
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forms of protest (Category 3 + Category 2) from the protected
forms of protest (Category 2 alone and Category 1).
V. A PROPOSAL FOR EFFECTIVELY APPLYING ANTITRUST LAWS IN
LIGHT OF FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
Whether violent acts so pervasively corrupt protest activity
as to eliminate all First Amendment protection is a fact-driven
inquiry which courts must undertake on a case-by-case basis. Su-
preme Court precedents offer guidance to test the degree of vio-
lence that will subject a direct-action protest to antitrust liability.
A. Using Claiborne as a Litmus Test to Discern
Protected Activity
While the political boycott at issue in Claiborne was largely
peaceful, the record reveals that ten incidents of violence oc-
curred over the course of the seven-year boycott.257 The Claiborne
holding provides a useful measure for determining the degree of
First Amendment protection courts should grant to protest activ-
ity. Activities "cannot be characterized as a violent conspiracy
simply by reference to ... relatively few violent acts."58 For a
boycott to be declared illegal, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
violence corrupted the entire boycott effort. The Court announced
that "[tihe burden of demonstrating that fear rather than pro-
tected conduct was the dominant force in the movement is
heavy."259 Ten acts over the course of seven years did not meet
this burden of proximate cause.26° Under the Claiborne rule, then,
anti-abortion protest consisting only of peaceful protests and oc-
casional trespass would not lose First Amendment protection
from antitrust liability.
257 458 US at 904, 924.
256 Id at 933.
259 Id.
260 Id at 923 ("[Rlespondents' losses were not proximately caused by violence or threats
of violence."). Consistent with Claiborne, courts have held other peaceful boycotts exempt
from antitrust liability. See, for example, Missouri v NOW, 620 F2d 1301, 1319 (8th Cir
1980) (holding Sherman Act inapplicable to peaceful boycott with goal of passing the
ERA).
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B. Using Milk Wagon to Gauge Whether an Activity
is Unprotected
The facts of Milk Wagon Union of Chicago, Local 753 v Mead-
owmoor Dairies, Inc261 offer another metric with which to deter-
mine the degree of constitutional protection a protest should re-
ceive. In Milk Wagon, a dispute arose when milk vendors de-
parted from union standards for distribution.262 The state issued
an injunction against the union's violent activity, as well as the
accompanying peaceful picketing.263 Unlike Claiborne, this case
involved considerable violence, including over fifty instances of
window smashing,264 bombings of plants and stores,265 arsons to
vendors' stores,266 destruction of vehicles,267 and beatings of work-
ers.
268
Because of the multiple violent and illegal acts, the Court
concluded that the activists had forfeited First Amendment pro-
tection for the entire protest.269 Justice Frankfurter, delivering
the opinion of the Court, announced that "[t]he picketing in this
case was set in a background of violence. In such a setting it
could justifiably be concluded that the momentum of fear gener-
ated by past violence would survive even though future picketing
might be wholly peaceful. '27" Frankfurter concluded that even the
peaceful picketing did not receive constitutional protection from
regulation because "violence had given to the picketing a coercive
effect whereby it would operate destructively as force and intimi-
dation."271
261 312 US 287 (1941).
262 See id at 291.
263 See id.
264 See id at 292. For similar tactic of antiabortion protesters, see Army of God, 99
Ways. (cited in note 162) (advocating use of pellet guns on thin glass and .22 caliber on
thick glass: "The best ... is that which does the most damage with the least amount of
noise and other kinds of exposure.").
265 See Milk Wagon, 312 US at 292.
266 Id. Compare Army of God, 99 Ways (cited in note 162) (describing how to light a
propane fire inside buildings while bypassing fire prevention systems).
267 See Milk Wagon, 312 US at 292.
268 Id (reporting in several other instances where "carloads of men followed vendors'
trucks, threatened the drivers, and in one instance shot at the truck and driver").
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Milk Wagon, 312 US at 298 (emphasis added).
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C. A Proposed Test for Applying Antitrust Laws to
Anti-Abortion Protest
On a case-by-case basis, courts should determine whether
anti-abortion protest operates through coercion and violence so as
to exceed the boundary set by Milk Wagon. Several of the tactics
utilized by the modern anti-abortion movement appear strikingly
similar to those reported in Milk Wagon.272 If violence and coer-
cion sufficiently dominate a particular anti-abortion protest to
meet Claiborne's heavy burden, the activity would fall outside of
the First Amendment's shelter and beyond the protective ambit
of Noerr immunity. In these situations, courts should impose an-
titrust liability to compensate businesses and the public for the
anticompetitive harms caused by both Category 2 and Category 3
direct-action protest activities.
With Claiborne and Milk Wagon at either end of the spectrum
between protected and unprotected activity, courts can determine
on a case-by-case basis whether the particular circumstances of
an anti-abortion protest cross into the territory of unprotected
activity and thus forfeits First Amendment protection. According
to this precedent, when violence is so prevalent in an anti-
abortion protest, such that its coercive effects permeate the pro-
test's peaceful aspects, the organization should receive no consti-
tutional protection. Taking into account our modern First
Amendment jurisprudence, Milk Wagon should not be applied to
its fullest extent and damages should not be assessed for Cate-
gory 1 activities.273 However, liability can clearly be constitution-
ally assessed against Category 2 and Category 3 activities with-
out violating First Amendment interests. 274 Further, Clairborne's
requirement of proximate cause275 will adequately protect activ-
ists from liability for Category 1 activity and prevent any poten-
tial chilling effects.
272 See Part II D 1.
273 See Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that First
Amendment rights do "not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and it likely to incite or produce such action"). But see S. Elizabeth
Wilborn Malloy and Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr, Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy:
Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 Wm & Mary L Rev 1159, 1170 (2000) (advocating crea-
tion of a new category of speech, "Harm Advocacy," which "would permit courts to better
analyze the conflict between society's need to protect its citizens from violence and the
First Amendment value of free expression and democratic deliberation").
274 See Parts IV A-B.
275 See note 260 and accompanying text.
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An example will aid in illustrating the proper functioning of
this test. A hypothetical anti-abortion protest, a month in dura-
tion, involved peaceful picketing 80 percent of the time. Ten per-
cent of the protesters' activities involved blockading the clinic and
making threatening phone calls to the clinic's medical suppliers
and business contacts. Protesters devoted the remaining ten per-
cent of the protest to butyric acid attacks and violent assaults on
clinic employees. Unlike the facts of Claiborne, where only ten
acts were documented over the course of seven years,276 here the
illegal acts-blockades, threats, acid attacks and violent as-
saults-occurred frequently over the month-long protest.
Eighty percent of protest activity is fully protected and should
not be assessed under antitrust liability, lest First Amendment
freedoms be violated. The Category 2 illegal activities, accounting
for ten percent of the protesters' time, attain a "coercive effect"277
when combined with the 10 percent of Category 3 activities. Such
coercive effect loses First Amendment protections under Milk
Wagon.278 Further, protesters engaging in Category 2 and Cate-
gory 3 activities cannot claim Noerr immunity because they con-
stitute "objectively unreasonable" sham attempts of indirect peti-
tioning. Thus, First Amendment principles and Noerr do not bar
antitrust regulation of these activities.
Additional constraints of this test and the general require-
ments of antitrust law lessen the danger to anti-abortion protest-
ers' constitutional rights. First, these protesters need to have
acted in a conspiracy and within the scope of the authority
granted by their organizations.279 Second, federalism concerns are
alleviated by the requirement that the clinic participate in inter-
state commerce.28 ° Finally, the "proximate cause" requirement of
Claiborne will limit antitrust damages to only those anticompeti-
tive effects caused by Category 2 and Category 3 behavior. As
with any damage calculation, this will be difficult, though the
complexity of liability does not provide an adequate reason to ne-
glect applicable law.
In the hypothetical protest, damage calculations will involve:
(1) assessing the effects of peaceful protests on customers' un-
willingness to enter the clinic and the clinic's subsequent decline
276 458 US at 904, 924.
277 312 US at 928.
278 Id.
279 See notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
280 See Part II A.
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in business; (2) assessing the effects of violent and illegal protest
activities on clients' access to the clinic and the damages done to
the clinic's revenues; and (3) comparing the degree of effective-
ness each type of protest has in detrimentally affecting clinic
business." 1 Once a ratio is established between the permissible
and impermissible types of protest, the monetary damages neces-
sary to compensate injured businesses and the public for anti-
competitive harms to the market can be assessed accordingly.
Thus, guided by the test, courts can identify where antitrust
can constitutionally apply to redress anticompetitive harms.
CONCLUSION
Direct-action protest comes in many forms. While peaceful
picketing and civil disobedience lie at the very heart of our demo-
cratic government, violent and illegal protests threaten to contra-
vene the democratic privileges of businesses providing abortion
services and consumers seeking abortions in a competitive mar-
ket. When such protests cause anticompetitive injury to the mar-
ketplace, the law should provide a mechanism to restore the
marketplace to equilibrium. That mechanism is antitrust. Recent
facts about the devastating economic effects of violent and illegal
protest warrant reexamination of antitrust laws as viable reme-
dies for anticompetitive distortions to the market for abortion
services. While other remedies criminally punish individuals or
address only the damage caused by acts of extreme violence, none
sufficiently compensates abortion providers and consumers for
the disruptive effects to the market.
The rights of protesters must be respected when they act
within the boundaries of the law, but the rights of citizens to
competitive markets, undisturbed by illegal threats and coercion,
remain a revered aspect of our capitalist democracy. When anti-
abortion protesters act outside the law's parameters and forfeit
First Amendment rights, antitrust can and should intercede to
protect other citizens' rights to a competitive economy.
281 Plaintiffs will also need to assert empirical evidence about the anticompetitive
effects on clinic business, perhaps supported by data collected from potential clients who
were deterred from entering the clinic due to fears of violent protests. Further, plaintiffs
must also assert factual evidence of anticompetitive effects in the relevant geographic
market. See Part II D 3.
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